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ABSTRACT 
School districts are increasingly relying upon closing school 
buildings as a result of the current national education-funding crisis. 
With a significant portion of students in the American public 
education system falling under the protection of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), districts must give proper 
attention to the IDEA’s strict requirements when closing school 
buildings. Yet, parents currently have no adequate remedy to ensure 
IDEA enforcement during the short timeframe before a school 
closes. Parents face the insurmountable obstacle of having to first 
exhaust the IDEA administrative remedies prior to bringing a court 
action to temporarily delay a district from closing a school. Without 
first engaging the administrative remedies process, courts summarily 
dismiss parents’ IDEA claims for lack of jurisdiction based on a 
want of administrative exhaustion.
By finding that the justifications for mandatory 
administrative exhaustion are lacking in the context of an imminent 
school closing and examining other situations in which courts waive 
the exhaustion requirement, it becomes evident that the time-
sensitive nature of a looming school closing makes compulsory 
administrative exhaustion inapplicable. Congress is expected to 
reauthorize the IDEA, which presents an ideal opportunity for it to 
remedy the current administrative exhaustion barrier. This can be 
achieved by providing courts with the jurisdiction to hear disputes 
from either party after an IDEA administrative hearing and by 
waiving mandatory administrative exhaustion for civil cases seeking 
a preliminary injunction to temporarily prevent an imminent school 
closing due to an alleged IDEA violation.
These changes will allow parents to timely argue the merits 
of their IDEA-related preliminary injunction claim, rather than 
spending the limited time before a school closes first litigating 
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whether a court has jurisdiction to enforce a hearing officer’s order 
or whether administrative exhaustion is appropriate. The time is now 
to take these steps to ensure that every student covered by the IDEA 
gets the required protection if—and, for many students in the United 
States, when—their school is slated to close.
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INTRODUCTION
Chicago Public Schools, the nation’s third largest school 
district,1 made national headlines when it announced that it was 
closing forty-nine school buildings prior to the start of the 2013–
2014 academic year.2 Resulting in a $1 billion budget deficit,3 the 
district faces a period of decreasing revenues, declining student 
enrollment, and rising operating costs.4 Parents of students with 
disabilities filed a lawsuit against the district alleging that the 
expedited timeline to close the schools did not permit a proper 
evaluation of the students’ individualized education plans or the 
district to properly accommodate the students’ needs in their new 
school building.5 The parents sought to temporarily enjoin the district 
from closing the schools until the district put adequate attention into 
the students’ educational accommodations as required under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).6
Over a mere three-month period, the parents and the district 
engaged in a rapid, and very public, hearing in the Northern District 
of Illinois where the court ultimately rejected the motion for a 
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1. Steven Yaccino, Protests Fail to Deter Chicago from Shutting 49 
Schools, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/
education/despite-protests-chicago-closing-schools.html?_r=0.
2. See, e.g., id.; Lorrain Forte, School Closings Pose Big Challenge for 
Chicago Public Schools, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2013, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lorraine-forte/chicago-school-closings_b_3149471
.html; Mary Wisniewski, Chicago Board Approves Largest School Closing,
REUTERS (May 22, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-
usa-education-chicago-vote-idUSBRE94L15P20130522.
3. See Yaccino, supra note 1.
4. Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013).
5. Complaint ¶ 1, Swan, 2013 WL 4401439 (No. 13-cv-03623) (stating 
that the parents claimed that the district’s school-closing timeline would 
significantly disrupt the more than 5,000 students in the district’s special education 
program).
6. Id. at 16.
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preliminary injunction.7 Despite the arguments about the underlying 
merits of the parents’ claim, Chicago Public Schools (CPS) skillfully 
prevailed in part because of the parents’ procedural overstep.8 The 
parents failed to first exhaust the administrative remedies under the 
IDEA prior to bringing the civil action, resulting in the court’s 
unequivocal rejection of their claim.9
The financial crisis facing CPS is not unique among public 
schools across the United States.10 The cause of this financial 
deterioration is complex, yet has undisputable causal factors ranging 
from the ways in which districts are funded to districts facing 
declining student enrollment.11 Regardless of the roots of the 
financial turmoil, many districts across the nation are turning to 
closing school buildings as a result of these economic strains in order 
to maintain a balanced budget or to alleviate budget deficits.12 The 
challenge that this situation creates is that the requirements of the 
IDEA do not fade due to budget woes.13 With a significant portion of 
students in the American public education system falling under the 
protection of the IDEA,14 districts must give proper attention to the 
IDEA’s requirements when closing school buildings.15 The 
combination of the widespread school closings and strict federal 
protections for students with disabilities brings to light a seemingly 
minor, yet inexplicitly significant, requirement: Parents currently 
must take the time to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative remedies 
prior to bringing a court action to temporarily stop a district from 
closing a school.16
7. Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *29.
8. See id. at *27-28. The court noted, however, that the parents were 
unlikely to prevail on the underlying merits of the claim. See infra note 280 and 
accompanying text.
9. See infra note 280 and accompanying text; Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at 
*19.
10. See infra note 56 (providing examples of education-funding crises 
throughout the United States).
11. See infra Section I.A.
12. See infra Section I.A.
13. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1-2, *28 (requiring the district to 
comply with the IDEA requirements despite a $1 billion deficit).
14. See infra Section I.B.
15. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1, *28 (requiring the district to 
comply with the IDEA requirements despite closing forty-nine schools within a 
single academic year).
16. See id. at *19 (holding that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim 
because they did not first exhaust the administrative remedies).
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This Note discusses how parents seeking to temporarily prevent 
a school from closing due to an alleged IDEA violation face an 
insurmountable obstacle by being required to first exhaust the 
administrative remedies.17 The flaw in this approach is that it is based 
on the presupposition that such an administrative remedy exists and 
that a district will adequately comply with an administrative hearing 
officer’s order.18 The hearing officer does not, however, have the 
power to grant a preliminary injunction to prevent a school from 
closing.19 Moreover, a parent is prevented from bringing a civil 
action to ensure district compliance with an administrative order due 
to the court’s lack of jurisdiction as dictated by the IDEA.20 While 
much has been written on the IDEA exhaustion requirement in 
general,21 there is currently a void in legal scholarship addressing the 
exhaustion requirement as it relates specifically to imminent school 
closings and the IDEA. This Note does not argue that parents 
assumedly have a valid claim for a preliminary injunction; rather, it 
argues that the time-sensitive nature of a looming school closing 
should allow a parent to forego administrative exhaustion and bring 
an action for a preliminary injunction directly to the courts to 
adjudicate the underlying merits of the claim.
Part I examines the status of education funding in the United 
States as the driving force behind districts closing schools and 
provides an overview of the IDEA and its requirements relating to 
17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012) (stating that before a party can bring a 
civil action, administrative remedies generally must be exhausted).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Subsection I.B.1 (providing an overview of the powers of an 
administrative hearing officer).
20. See infra Section I.B (discussing how courts strictly read the IDEA’s 
jurisdictional-giving language).
21. See, e.g., Susan G. Clark, Administrative Remedy Under IDEA: Must It 
Be Exhausting?, 163 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2002) (examining the established conditions 
for requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies and instances in which the 
requirement is waived); Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative 
Exhaustion Requirements and Establishing Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law and 
Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 349 
(2009) (examining the implications of failing to exhaust administrative remedies, 
when exhaustion is required and when it is waived, and the diverging approaches to 
applying the IDEA’s jurisdictional-giving language); Peter J. Maher, Note, Caution 
on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation of the IDEA’s Exhaustion 
Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259 (2011) 
(providing an overview of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement and its application to 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act).
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administrative exhaustion. Part II discusses how courts approach the 
exhaustion requirement, both in the context of school closings and in 
general. Part III analyzes the challenges that imposing the 
administrative-exhaustion requirement presents to families in the 
context of school closings and proposes two changes to the IDEA 
that attempt to resolve these complications.
I. COMBINING CONSTRAINTS ON DISTRICTS: FINANCES AND THE 
IDEA
Public school districts across the United States face a myriad of 
challenges in providing adequate educational services.22 Two of 
these challenges are school district funding and the statutory 
requirements of the IDEA. The educational funding system based on 
state tax revenue places district finances at the mercy of the overall 
health of the economy.23 Despite many districts making drastic 
budget cuts in the face of limited financial resources, they still must 
comply with the IDEA mandates.24 The IDEA provides a 
comprehensive framework for districts to follow to ensure that 
adequate educational services are provided to qualifying students and 
for an administrative hearing process for addressing disputes 
regarding IDEA compliance.25 While the current underfunded K-12
education system can lead districts to close one or more schools, the 
strict requirements of the IDEA leave parents with limited options to 
22. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 
222 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (“I hope and believe that we are all 
mindful of the challenges school administrators face in providing a safe 
environment, conducive to learning and civic development, for children and young 
adults. Those challenges have never been greater than they are today.”); Sypniewski 
v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 268 (3d Cir. 2002) (“We 
recognize the challenges faced by school officials when attempting to adopt 
disciplinary policies directed at racial harassment.”); Newsome v. Batavia Local 
Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 924-25 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Today’s public schools face 
severe challenges in maintaining the order and discipline necessary for the 
impartation of knowledge.”); AFT Mich. v. State, 825 N.W.2d 595, 609 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2012) (“We are not unmindful of the budgetary challenges facing local school
districts . . . .”).
23. See infra Section I.A (discussing how district funding is largely tied to 
state tax revenue).
24. See infra Section I.B (providing an overview of the strict requirements 
of the IDEA).
25. See infra Section I.B.
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ensure that the district complies with a student’s educational rights 
during the school-closing process.26
A. Insufficient Educational Funding and Its Dire Consequences for 
School Districts
Public schools are the anchors of their respective 
communities.27 But, as a result of the funding crisis facing many 
school districts across the nation,28 districts29 are increasingly forced 
to make painful budget cuts year after year.30 School boards have 
little choice but to take drastic measures—from laying off teachers, 
administrators, and staff to closing entire school buildings31—to 
ensure that the district’s doors remain open. The federal government 
has stepped in on multiple occasions to provide districts with billions 
of dollars in emergency funding to ward off looming budget cuts.32
26. See infra Part II (discussing the limited avenues through which a parent 
can seek to enforce the IDEA protections).
27. See Kristi L. Bowman, State Takeovers of School Districts and Related 
Litigation: Michigan as a Case Study, 45 URB. LAW. 1, 19 (2013).
28. See Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal 
for Federal Reform, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 895 (2011) (“As school districts across 
the country continue to face falling revenues, they are scrambling to cut their 
budgets and adjust to leaner times. But districts have never had to make such drastic 
adjustments—and some of them are nearing a point of fiscal crisis.”).
29. Throughout this Note, the term “district” is used to indicate an entire K-
12 public school district, whereas the term “school” represents a single school 
building within a district.
30. See Bowman, supra note 28, at 898-99 (discussing the various ways in 
which districts cut expenses from their budgets).
31. See id.
32. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Congress Passes Bill to Provide 
$10 Billion to Support 160,000 Education Jobs Nationwide (Aug. 10, 2010), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/congress-passes-bill-provide-10-billion-
support-160000-education-jobs-nationwide (announcing that President Barack 
Obama signed into law the Education Jobs Law in 2010 that provided $10 billion “to 
support an estimated 160,000 education jobs nationwide”); Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: Saving and 
Creating Jobs and Reforming Education (Mar. 7, 2009), 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/implementation.html (providing 
information on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which 
provided $100 billion to schools across the nation).
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Those emergency funds have long since been depleted,33 and districts 
are largely left to independently brave the financial storm.34
While there is an array of causes that contributed to and 
continue to sustain the funding crisis in districts throughout the 
United States, leaders in educational academia generally point 
toward a certain direction when determining the overarching cause—
the state and local tax system.35 School districts, on average among 
all fifty states, rely on state and local government for 87.5% of their 
overall funding, which amounts to roughly $528.8 billion nationally 
from state and local taxes.36 While there is not a uniform national 
formula for funding schools, there is a general structure: The state 
portion of funding, which is estimated to be 44.1% of a district’s 
total revenue,37 is primarily drawn from income and sales taxes,38 and 
the local portion of funding, which is estimated to be 43.4% of a 
district’s total revenue,39 is primarily drawn from property taxes, 
from both residential and commercial properties.40 With public 
education funding being almost exclusively at the mercy of income, 
sales, and property taxes, districts face severe budget restrictions 
when the overall economy plummets,41 as the nation faced in the 
recent Great Recession.42
Despite the official end of the recession, the national and state 
economies have hardly recovered—slow economic growth and high 
33. See Bowman, supra note 28, at 895 (stating in a 2011 article that the 
additional federal education funds are soon to run out).
34. See id. at 899 (“Congress intended the stimulus money to stretch over 
two years, but most states used the vast majority of those funds during Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2010.”).
35. See, e.g., id. at 903; Susan Pace Hamill, The Vast Injustice Perpetuated 
by State and Local Tax Policy, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 117, 120, 146 (2008).
36. STEPHEN Q. CORNMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, NCES 2013-
342, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATION: SCHOOL YEAR 2010–11 (FISCAL YEAR 2011) 3 (2013), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013342.pdf.
37. Id. at 8.
38. See Federal, State, and Local K-12 School Finance Overview, FED.
EDUC. BUDGET PROJECT (June 30, 2013, 7:25 PM), 
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/school-finance.
39. CORNMAN, supra note 36, at 8.
40. See Federal, State, and Local K-12 School Finance Overview, supra
note 38.
41. See Bowman, supra note 28, at 908.
42. See Chris Isidore, It’s Official: Recession Since Dec. ‘07, CNN MONEY 
(Dec. 1, 2008, 5:40 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/01/news/economy/recession.
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unemployment still taint the American economy.43 Job loss and 
continued unemployment contribute to decreased and stagnated state 
income tax revenue.44 The combination of decreased home values 
and the prevalence of foreclosures lead to low property tax revenue,45
and low consumer spending results in low sales tax revenue.46 This 
combination led to the perfect storm for the fiscal crisis currently 
facing many districts across the nation.47 While some state budgets 
appear to be increasing revenues from their recession-era levels,48
this fact does not inevitably equate to an improved outlook for 
districts.49 Even while the American economy starts to turn around, it 
may be more than a decade before tax revenues return to their pre-
43. See Michael Sivy, What the Current Economic Outlook Means for 
American Families, TIME (Jan. 16, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/16/
what-the-current-economic-outlook-means-for-american-families.
44. See Bowman, supra note 28, at 903 (“These reductions have many 
causes, but the most immediate causes are that states’ income tax revenue has been 
hit hard by job losses; local and state property tax revenue has fallen sharply because 
home values have been dropping as the real estate bubble burst and tax 
delinquencies and home foreclosures rose; and state sales tax revenues have 
decreased because of substantial drops in consumer spending.”).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 908 (stating that “[t]he general economic crisis clearly is the
dominant, immediate trigger of most school districts’ current fiscal crises”).
48. There are indications that state tax revenues are starting to turn a corner 
in some states. In Michigan, for example, lawmakers are grappling with how to 
appropriate a $1.3 billion surplus; while some advocate using the funds to increase 
K-12 school district funding, others argue that the increase may not be sustainable 
long term. See Niraj Chokshi, Michigan Session Preview: What to Do with $1.3 
Billion Surplus?, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/01/14/michigan-session-preview-what-to-do-with-a-1-3-
billion-surplus/; Zoe Clark & Rick Pluta, Michigan’s Budget Surplus: More Money, 
More Problems? Sure, but It Beats the Alternative, MICH. RADIO (Jan. 3, 2014, 1:35 
PM), http://michiganradio.org/post/michigan-s-budget-surplus-more-money-more-
problems-sure-it-beats-alternative. Michigan Governor Rick Snyder announced on 
February 3, 2014 that his proposed 2014–2015 budget will increase K-12 school 
district funding by $322 million, though $270 million of that amount is designated to 
offset the increase in school retirement costs. See Paul Egan, Snyder to Propose 
$322-Million Funding Boost for K-12 Education, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 3, 
2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.freep.com/article/20140203/NEWS06/302030053/
Snyder-education-funding-increase-Michigan.
49. See DIANE STARK RENTNER & NANCY KOBER, CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY,
AFTER THE STIMULUS MONEY ENDS: THE STATUS OF STATE K-12 EDUCATION 
FUNDING AND REFORMS 1 (2012), available at http://www.cep-dc.org/
cfcontent_file.cfm?Attachment=RentnerKober%5FReport%5FAfterStimulus%5F02
0612%2Epdf.
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recession levels.50 School districts continue, and will likely continue 
in the foreseeable future, to face a grim financial outlook.51
The restricting budgets facing districts across the nation are 
leading many schools to close their doors.52 Michigan’s educational 
landscape, for example, is in a bleak position with a historic fifty-six 
school districts with budget deficits.53 In Illinois, forty-five districts 
are classified as “highest risk” by its State Board of Education 
because of their severe financial status.54 These are just two 
examples of the many districts facing financial turmoil across the 
nation.55 Many districts are resorting to closing school buildings to 
help alleviate the financial strains56—closing a school results in cost 
savings by eliminating redundant administrative, custodial, and food-
service staff, and reducing costs associated with utilities, 
50. Bowman, supra note 28, at 900 (stating that “‘it could take 15 years or 
more for tax revenue to rebound to pre-recession levels’” (quoting Nick Bunkley, 
Debt Rising, A City Seeks Donations in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at 
A10)).
51. See id.
52. See supra notes 30-34; see also EDWARD MCMILIN, NAT’L 
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR EDUC. FACILITIES, CLOSING A SCHOOL BUILDING: A
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.ncef.org/
pubs/closing.pdf (“[S]chool districts around the nation have announced major school 
closings. . . . Decreased revenues from taxes, fees, and reduced federal funding, less 
return on investments, and increased cost to continue services, have resulted in 
significant budget deficits. As a result, government units at all levels are being 
forced to reduce funding for education.”).
53. See Brian Smith, See the 56 Michigan School Districts with Budget 
Deficits, MLIVE (Sept. 13, 2013, 9:19 AM), http://www.mlive.com/education/
index.ssf/2013/09/see_the_56_school_districts_wi.html.
54. See 2013 School District Financial Profile, ILL. ST. BOARD EDUC.,
http://www.isbe.state.il.us/sfms/p/profile.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
55. Florida has fifty-eight public charter schools facing financial deficits. 
See FLA. AUDITOR GEN., REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL TRENDS AND FINDINGS 
IDENTIFIED IN CHARTER SCHOOL AND CHARTER TECHNICAL CAREER CENTER 2011-12
FISCAL YEAR AUDIT REPORTS 1 (2013), available at http://www.myflorida.com/
audgen/pages/pdf_files/2014-002.pdf. Philadelphia School District faces a $304 
million deficit, resulting in the layoff of 20% of the district’s staff. See Suzi Parker, 
Bankrupt in Philadelphia: Could This Happen to Your School District?, TAKEPART
(July 8, 2013), http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/07/08/philadelphia-school-
district-financial-crisis; see also infra note 56.
56. See Bowman, supra note 28, at 898; see also Kayla Webley, Are School 
Closings Discriminatory?, TIME (May 23, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/
05/23/are-school-closings-discriminatory (stating that New York City is slated to 
close seventeen of its schools, Philadelphia district officials announced that twenty-
three schools are closings, and Washington D.C. is closing fifteen schools).
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maintenance, and supplies.57 A total of 1,929 schools closed in the 
United States during the 2010–2011 school year, up from 1,515 
school closings in 2008–2009.58 While scholars continue to debate 
the influence that educational funding has on student achievement,59
the fact remains that schools cannot keep the proverbial schoolhouse 
gates open without adequate funding.60 Always looming in the 
background for districts is the fact that shrinking budgets result in 
fewer available financial resources to ensure compliance with the 
demanding IDEA.
B. The IDEA’s Strict Requirements
The IDEA61 is the cornerstone to ensuring that students with 
disabilities receive the necessary services to allow them to benefit 
from educational instruction provided by districts.62 In the latest 
national data collected by the National Center for Education 
Statistics, 13.1% of students in the United States school system, 
57. See MCMILIN, supra note 52, at 3 (“Most of the savings result from 
non-classroom personnel costs which would no longer be required. Generally these 
positions include principals, assistant principals, clerical staff, food service, and 
custodial personnel. Teaching staff is usually not included because the impact 
district-wide is based on collective bargaining agreements, retirements, and 
personnel who annually leave the district. . . . In addition to any personnel savings, 
budget reductions will result from reduced utility cost (60% factor), infrastructure 
maintenance cost (90% factor), budgeted capital maintenance projects, reduced 
rubbish and shredding costs, and all supplies.”).
58. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, NCES 2014-015, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2012, at 176 (2013),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014015.pdf. Out of the 1,929 schools that 
closed during the 2010–2011 school year, 1,486 were traditional schools, 72 were 
special education schools, 7 were vocational schools, and 364 were alternative 
schools. Id.
59. See, e.g., BRUCE BAKER, ALBERT SHANKER INST., REVISITING THAT 
AGE-OLD QUESTION: DOES MONEY MATTER IN EDUCATION? 1-3 (2012), available at 
http://www.shankerinstitute.org/images/doesmoneymatter_final.pdf; MICHAEL 
PARIS, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE 
REFORM 47-49 (2010); MICHAEL A. REBELL & JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI, CAMPAIGN FOR 
FISCAL EQUITY, INC., OF COURSE MONEY MATTERS: WHY THE ARGUMENTS TO THE 
CONTRARY NEVER ADDED UP 5-8 (2004), available at http://www.schoolfunding.
info/resource_center/research/MoneyMattersFeb2004.pdf.
60. See Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, at 
*1-2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (noting the closing of forty-nine schools as a result of 
a $1 billion budget deficit).
61. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-50 (2012).
62. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982) (discussing 
the IDEA’s statutory requirements).
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which equates to roughly 6,480,540 students, fall under the 
protection of the IDEA.63 Students who are eligible to receive the 
benefits of the IDEA64 are entitled to a free and appropriate public 
education, which the Supreme Court defines as consisting of 
specially created educational instruction to meet the unique needs of 
students with disabilities.65 The provision of a free and appropriate 
public education is generally met when individualized instruction is 
provided along with supportive services, which can include, for 
example, extended time on tests or specialized equipment, such as a 
therapeutic chair, that allow a student to benefit from instruction.66 In 
order for students to receive these specialized services, the district, 
along with the parents, is charged with creating an Individualized 
Education Plan (IEP) for the child.67 The IEP establishes the 
student’s educational goals, the necessary special education services 
that the child will receive, and the ways in which the goals and 
services will be evaluated.68 There are a number of procedural 
safeguards that the IDEA provides parents to help ensure that 
districts continuously comply with both the IEP and its obligation to 
provide the eligible student with a free and appropriate public 
education.69
63. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, NCES 2012-001, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2011, at 87 (2012),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012001.pdf.
64. Eligibility is defined by 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (2012) and 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.7(c)(1)-(13) (2003). For a detailed overview of the process through which a 
student is deemed eligible under the IDEA, see Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling 
Eligibility Requirements Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 
MO. L. REV. 441, 451 (2004).
65. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89 (defining a free and appropriate public 
education as “educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of 
the handicapped child”).
66. See id. at 189 (“[I]f personalized instruction is being provided with 
sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and 
the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a 
‘free appropriate public education’ as defined by the [IDEA].”).
67. See Garda, supra note 64, at 444-45.
68. See id. at 445 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347).
69. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (enumerating the procedural safeguards to 
include an opportunity for the parents “to examine all records relating to such child 
and to participate in meetings with respect to the identification, evaluation, and 
educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to such child, and to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the 
child”).
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1. The Administrative Hearing Process
The essential device for resolving IDEA disputes between 
districts and parents is an impartial administrative hearing.70 These 
hearing proceedings, which are conducted by a hearing officer,71 can 
come in one of two forms depending on the selection of the 
individual state.72 A state can select either a one-tiered system in 
which a single hearing takes place to adjudicate the dispute, or a two-
tiered system that includes the initial hearing, but that also provides 
an additional level of review.73 The scope of the hearing officer’s 
authority is generally limited to determining the sufficiency of a 
student’s disability classification and the implementation of the 
IDEA, and to ordering districts to take corrective action to come into 
compliance with the Act.74 If an administrative hearing is successful, 
then it promotes judicial efficiency by preventing unnecessary 
judicial intervention.75 The hearing avoids immediate court action 
based on the speculative premise that district officials will correct 
any problems identified through the hearing.76
The hearing process generally mirrors the procedural and 
adversarial nature of an action in civil court, resulting in an 
elongated trial-like process.77 The IDEA enumerates strict procedural 
requirements, including the mandatory content within a parent’s 
initial complaint78 and within the district’s response to the parent,79
70. See Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review 
Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 2-3 (2011) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)).
71. See id. at 3 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)-(g)).
72. See id. (“The IDEA gives states the choice of having a one-tiered 
system, consisting solely of an impartial due process hearing, or a two-tiered system, 
which includes an additional officer level review.”).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 9 (providing an overview of the specific powers of a hearing 
officer).
75. See Clark, supra note 21, at 4.
76. See id.
77. See Andria B. Saia, Special Education Due Process Hearings, 79 PA. B.
ASS’N Q. 1, 2 (2008).
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(I)-(IV) (stating that the complaint shall 
include “the name of the child, the address of the residence[s] of the child (or 
available contact information in the case of a homeless child), . . . the name of the 
school the child is attending,” a “description of the nature of the problem of the child 
relat[ed] to such proposed initiation or change, including facts relating to such [a] 
problem,” and “a proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and 
available to the party at the time”). The Act also requires each “[s]tate educational 
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standards through which the complaint can be amended,80 and an 
initial determination by the hearing officer of whether these 
procedural requirements have been met.81 After a mandatory initial 
meeting between the parents and the district,82 the administrative 
hearing itself will commence, during which both parties have the 
right to, among other things, be represented by counsel, present 
evidence, compel the attendance of witnesses, and cross-examine 
witnesses.83 These intricate requirements can, however, “be time-
consuming and elaborate,” resulting in parties attempting to sidestep 
the requirements by taking action in civil court.84 Nevertheless, 
before parents or district officials can bring a dispute to civil court 
for resolution, compliance with these administrative procedures is 
largely required under the IDEA; a court is likely to dismiss a related 
civil claim if the administrative remedy process is not first 
exhausted.85
2. Seeking a Review of the Hearing Officer’s Decision
Once an order is issued by an administrative hearing officer, 
there are strict statutory limitations on how to proceed with a 
subsequent dispute regarding compliance.86 The IDEA provides that 
“any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a 
hearing may appeal” its findings.87 In two-tiered systems, the party 
agency to develop a model form to assist parents in filing a complaint and due 
process complaint notice.” Id. § 1415(b)(8).
79. Id. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I)(aa)-(dd) (stating that the district’s response 
must be provided within ten days of receiving the complaint and it must include (1) 
“an explanation of why the agency proposed or refused to take . . . action raised in 
the complaint”; (2) “a description of other options that the IEP Team considered and 
the reasons why those options were rejected”; (3) “a description of each evaluation 
procedure, assessment, record, or report the agency used as the basis for the 
proposed or refused action”; and (4) “a description of the factors that are relevant to 
the agency’s proposal or refusal”).
80. Id. § 1415(c)(2)(E)(i)(I)-(II).
81. Id. § 1415(c)(2)(D) (noting that the hearing officer has five days to 
make such a determination).
82. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i).
83. Id. § 1415(h)(1)-(2).
84. See Clark, supra note 21, at 2.
85. Id. at 1-2 (citing Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 888 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. 
Pa. 1995)). There are established exceptions for the required exhaustion of 
administrative exhaustion. See infra Section II.D.
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A).
87. Id. § 1415(g)(1).
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aggrieved can appeal to the second level of administrative review.88
In a one-tiered system, and those cases decided at the second level in 
a two-tiered system, the party aggrieved may appeal the officer’s 
determination by bringing an action in federal or state court, but 
successfully getting into court requires stringent adherence to the 
IDEA’s statutory language.89
An integral aspect of the IDEA’s language is that only the 
“party aggrieved” by a hearing officer’s decision can have that 
determination reviewed by a separate adjudicatory body.90 A parent 
may prevail at the hearing by receiving an order for the district to 
take remedial measures; yet, if the district refuses to comply or 
complies inadequately with that order, then the parent is unable to 
seek enforcement through the courts—the parent is not the “party 
aggrieved” as required under the IDEA’s jurisdictional-giving 
language.91 As a result, courts may require that a parent who 
obtained a favorable outcome in an administrative hearing return to 
the administrative forum to reinitiate the exhaustion process relating 
to the issue of district compliance.92 If a district fails to conform to a 
hearing officer’s order, then Norris v. Board of Education opined 
that an adequate remedy is “plainly available” to parents in the form 
of additional administrative proceedings,93 resulting in that court 
dismissing the civil action for lack of jurisdiction.94 Thus, parents 
who technically prevail in the initial hearing process have no other 
88. See Wasserman, supra note 21, at 359 (citing 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(A)).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 388-89.
91. See id. at 359, 389 (“When parents or the applicable agency are 
aggrieved by the decision at Tier I in a one-tier state, or the Tier II decision in a two-
tier state, they may appeal the decision by filing a civil action in federal or state 
court[s].”). To be a party aggrieved, the hearing officer largely must issue an order 
that is adverse to the parent’s desired outcome. See id. at 389.
92. See Norris ex rel. Norris v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1467-69 
(S.D. Ind. 1992); see also Wasserman, supra note 21, at 390 (“[A] plaintiff who 
obtains a favorable result at due process may be required to return to the 
administrative forum, where the nature of the due process decision contemplated 
further proceedings of the IEP team.”).
93. See Norris, 797 F. Supp. at 1468 (stating that when a district failed to 
comply with a hearing officer’s order, “an adequate remedy was plainly available” 
for the parent.) The court went on to note that “[w]hen a school district ignores a 
valid final order, the proper remedy is enforcement of that order . . . through the 
administrative process.” Id. 
94. See id. at 1469.
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source for seeking district compliance but to further engage in the 
IDEA administrative remedy process.95
3. The Reasons for the Adamant Exhaustion Requirement
When faced with a question of whether to dismiss a case for 
want of administrative exhaustion, courts frequently rely upon the 
applicability of the underlying rationales for requiring exhaustion.96
Courts generally justify the requirement—even when the 
administrative hearing officer is hypothetically unable to correct the 
violation—by noting that the hearing process creates a detailed 
factual record that can be subsequently used to fully inform a court 
proceeding.97 Such a requirement also allows the state educational 
agency to use its expertise to explore the technical educational issues 
presented by the dispute.98 Promoting judicial efficiency is another 
oft-cited justification for requiring exhaustion because it gives the 
educational agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in 
their programs for students with disabilities.99 These justifications are 
the underpinnings on which courts rely in strictly enforcing the 
exhaustion requirement.100
Courts do not always require exhaustion when these 
justifications are not applicable to the case at bar.101 The Second 
Circuit, for example, relied on this reasoning when it waived the 
95. See, e.g., id. at 1468-69.
96. See, e.g., Rita S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of 
Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004); Bills ex rel. Bills v. Homer Consol. Sch. 
Dist. No. 33-C, 959 F. Supp. 507, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
97. See Douglass v. District of Columbia, 750 F. Supp. 2d 54, 63 (D.D.C. 
2010) (“[E]ven if a hearing officer would hypothetically be unable to correct 
Plaintiff’s alleged systemic violations, Plaintiff’s Section 504 claim raises questions 
of educational policy ‘upon which the state experts should first have their say’ and 
which ‘the record created by the application of their expertise to those problems will 
certainly help the federal court resolve the issue in a more informed manner.’” 
(quoting Riley v. Ambach, 668 F.2d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 1981))).
98. See Christopher S., 384 F.3d at 1209.
99. See id.; see also Bills, 959 F. Supp. at 511 (stating that “[t]here are 
numerous reasons for requiring exhaustion . . . including: (1) to permit an agency to 
exercise its discretion and expertise; (2) to develop technical issues and a factual 
record prior to judicial review; (3) to prevent circumvention of agency procedures; 
and (4) to avoid unnecessary judicial review by allowing agencies to correct 
errors”); Douglass, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 60 (outlining the “two sound policies” that 
the exhaustion requirement advances).
100. See supra notes 97-99.
101. See N.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 114-15 (2d Cir. 
2004).
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exhaustion requirement in J.S. v. Attica Central Schools.102 This case 
involved six students who claimed that the district’s programming as 
a whole violated the students’ rights to a free and appropriate 
education under the IDEA.103 While the court did not deny the 
importance of exhaustion in “textbook” cases concerning the IDEA, 
it held that J.S. was not a “textbook” case.104 The issue in J.S.
concerned the district’s total failure to prepare and implement 
students’ IEPs,105 rather than a simplified dispute regarding the mere 
contents of an individual student’s IEP.106 As such, the court held 
that the plaintiffs’ claims were not the standardized type from which 
a court would substantially benefit by having an administrative 
record.107 When it comes time for courts to determine whether to 
dismiss a case for lack of exhaustion or to proceed to adjudicate the 
merits of the claim, its “inquiry is whether pursuit of administrative 
remedies under the facts of a given case will further the general 
purpose of exhaustion.”108 In the absence of the foundational reasons 
for mandatory exhaustion, then, waiving the exhaustion requirement 
is supported.109
102. See id. at 115.
103. See id. at 110-12 (stating that the students alleged twenty-seven ways 
that the district failed to comply with the IDEA in a systematic manner).
104. See id. at 114-15 (“We acknowledge Hope’s recognition of the 
importance of exhaustion in ‘textbook’ cases presenting issues involving individual 
children where the remedy is best left to educational experts operating within the 
framework of the local and state review procedures. However, the complaint in this 
case does not allow us to conclude that this is such a ‘textbook’ case—at least not at 
this stage of the proceedings. The district court made clear that the complaint does 
not challenge the content of Individualized Education Programs, but rather the 
School District’s total failure to prepare and implement Individualized Education 
Programs.” (referencing Hope v. Cortines, 872 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 69 
F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 1995))).
105. See id. at 115.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 114; see also Virginia H. ex rel. Kristi H. v. Tri-Valley Sch. 
Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 628, 633 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (“If no factual record needs to be 
developed, i.e. the matter is purely legal, to proceed through the administrative 
proceedings is unnecessary.”).
108. See Hoeft v. Tuscon Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 
1992) (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 484 (1986); McKart v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)); see also Bailey ex rel. J.B. v. Avilla R-
XIII Sch. Dist., 721 F.3d 588, 596 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that a plaintiff must show 
that the alleged violation “in the proceedings is such that it would not further the 
underlying purposes of exhaustion” to be granted a waiver).
109. See supra note 107.
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Districts face the stringent requirements of the IDEA110 with 
increasingly less money.111 Fewer financial resources have caused 
many districts to plunge into economic distress, resulting in the 
consolidation of schools as a cost-saving measure.112 When parents 
attempt to require a district to comply with the IDEA during a 
school-closing process, however, they are faced with numerous 
limitations due to the IDEA’s strict statutory requirements.113 These 
obstacles taken together create a demanding exhaustion barrier for 
parents to overcome when seeking to ensure IDEA enforcement 
during a school closing.114
II. SCHOOL CLOSINGS AND PARENTS FIGHTING TO STOP THEM
With an increase in school closings due to financial constraints, 
parents have resorted to court action in an attempt to safeguard a 
student’s rights under the IDEA during a closure.115 Reliance on a 
preliminary injunction to temporarily stop a school closing is an 
increasingly used method among parents for seeking IDEA 
enforcement in the face of a school closing.116 The CPS case, Swan v. 
Board of Education of Chicago, illustrates how courts approach 
parents’ attempts to get a preliminary injunction for this very 
reason.117 Looking at how courts generally approach civil actions 
brought without first exhausting the IDEA administrative remedies118
helps to expose the limitations of the administrative-exhaustion 
110. See supra Section I.B (providing an overview of the IDEA’s statutory 
requirements).
111. See supra Section I.A (discussing how declining state tax revenue has 
led to decreasing finances for districts).
112. See supra Section I.A (discussing the cost-saving measures 
implemented by districts, which include closing schools).
113. See infra Section II.B (explaining the specific procedures that a parent 
must take when seeking IDEA enforcement).
114. See infra Part III.
115. See, e.g., Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013); Comb v. Benji’s Special Educ. Acad., Inc., 745 F. 
Supp. 2d 755, 766 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
116. See infra Section II.A (discussing the legal implications of a 
preliminary injunction).
117. See infra Section II.B (describing the claims in the CPS case and how 
the court approached them).
118. See infra Section II.C (explaining the instances in which courts will 
dismiss an action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
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process.119 Understanding the determinative role that administrative 
exhaustion plays is essential for grappling with the serious 
challenges that parents face when seeking to protect a student’s 
access to a free and appropriate education under the IDEA during 
school closings.120
A. Relying on a Preliminary Injunction for IDEA Compliance
Seeking a preliminary injunction is a tactic that parents rely 
upon in an attempt to temporarily prevent their child’s school from 
closing due to an alleged IDEA violation.121 The increased 
prevalence of school closings due to financial strains122 and the 
resulting student placement in new schools have caused parental 
concerns that their district—in its haste to close the schools and 
reassign the students—is violating their students’ rights under the 
IDEA.123 A preliminary injunction, or a temporary restraining order 
(TRO) in some instances,124 is an avenue through which the parents 
can lessen that haste to ensure that their students’ rights are not 
overlooked.125
The allure of seeking a preliminary injunction is a result of its 
unique, short-term legal consequence of preserving the status quo.126
While preliminary injunctions were once used only in extraordinary 
circumstances, courts issue them with much more frequency in 
modern American jurisprudence.127 A party may in some instances 
119. See infra Section II.D (illustrating the scenarios in which courts will 
waive the exhaustion requirement).
120. See infra Part III.
121. See, e.g., Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013); Comb v. Benji’s Special Educ. Acad., Inc., 745 F. 
Supp. 2d 755, 761, 766 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining 
order and injunctive relief to order Defendants to refrain from closing the 
Academy . . . .”).
122. See supra Section I.A.
123. See infra Section III.B.
124. For a brief overview of the difference between a preliminary injunction 
and a TRO, see infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
125. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401430, at *1; see also Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. 
Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2009).
126. See, e.g., Garcia, 561 F.3d at 107; Weintraub v. Hanrahan, 435 F.2d 
461, 463 (7th Cir. 1970); Crue v. Aiken, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1082 (C.D. Ill. 
2001).
127. See KRISTIN STOLL-DEBELL, NANCY L. DEMPSEY & BRADFORD E.
DEMPSEY, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS 3 (2009) (stating that “in this rapidly developing era of social change, 
technological development, and government legislation and regulation, the once-
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first seek a TRO prior to a preliminary injunction,128 as a TRO 
preserves the status quo until a court can hear the merits on the 
action for the more permanent-in-nature preliminary injunction.129
The benefit of the issuance of a preliminary injunction for the 
harmed party is clear—the preliminary injunction provides a legally 
enforceable mechanism to minimize a hardship while the underlying 
issue can be properly resolved.130 In instances of a school closing and 
an IDEA violation, for example, a preliminary injunction can require 
the district to temporarily halt the school closing so that the district 
can remedy an IDEA violation related to the closure prior to its 
continuation.131
The elements required to issue a preliminary injunction play a 
determinative role in a parent’s pursuit of seeking IDEA 
enforcement.132 While there are jurisdictional differences regarding 
the requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction,133 the five-part 
test generally encompasses the considerations of the other two 
widely used tests.134 Courts applying the five-part test require that the 
extraordinary remedy of preliminary injunctive relief now appears to be quite 
ordinary”).
128. See, e.g., Crue, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1078, 1082-83. A TRO can, in 
certain instances, be issued without initial notice to the opposing party, but will 
typically last no more than ten days. See THOMAS E. PATTERSON, HANDLING THE 
BUSINESS EMERGENCY: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTIONS 17 (2009). Once a preliminary injunction is issued, it is generally not 
dissolved until deemed appropriate by a court. See id.
129. See Garcia, 561 F.3d at 107 (quoting Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. 
Flight Eng’rs’ Int’l Ass’n, 306 F.2d 840, 842-43 (2d Cir. 1962)).
130. See Crue, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (stating that the motivation for 
seeking a TRO is to “minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate 
resolution of the suit”).
131. See, e.g., Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (“According to Plaintiffs, the schedule for the 
closures will not allow enough time for administrators in the new schools to ensure 
that the IEPs of disabled students are properly revised and implemented, nor will 
there be sufficient time for students with disabilities to adequately acclimate to their 
new schools in violation of the [IDEA and Americans with Disabilities Act].”).
132. See infra Section II.B.
133. Courts typically apply the same standard for evaluating a TRO, unless a 
court issues it ex parte, in which case a higher standard applies. See STOLL-DEBELL,
DEMPSEY & DEMPSEY, supra note 127, at 30-31 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)).
134. The “traditional test” involves a four-part inquiry into: (1) “the 
movant’s likelihood of success on the merits”; (2) “the likelihood of irreparable 
harm absent preliminary injunctive relief”; (3) “the balance of harms between the 
movant and the nonmovant”; and (4) “the public interest.” Id. at 20. The three-part 
test requires that the movant establish “that it is subject to irreparable harm”; and 
either (a) “that it will likely succeed on the merits”; or (b) “that there are sufficiently 
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movant “establish (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits of the underlying claim; (2) no adequate remedy at law; and 
(3) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.”135 Once the first 
three elements are met, a court will then consider (4) whether the 
alleged harm to the movant absent the preliminary injunction 
outweighs the potential harm that the preliminary injunction will 
inflict on the defendant; and (5) whether the issuance of the 
preliminary injunction will disserve the public interest.136 This five-
part test is notably used by the Seventh Circuit and played a central 
role in the parents’ failed attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction 
in the CPS case, Swan v. Board of Education of Chicago.137
B. Swan v. Board of Education of Chicago
The CPS case138 illustrates how a court will approach an action 
for a preliminary injunction due to an alleged IDEA violation absent 
administrative exhaustion.139 As a result of CPS announcing plans to 
close forty-nine schools over a single summer,140 parents of students 
with disabilities141 brought two separate actions for preliminary 
injunctions against CPS to temporarily prevent the schools from 
closing.142 The first suit alleged that the school-closing schedule 
would disproportionately harm children in special education 
serious questions going to the merits of the case to make them a fair ground for 
litigation and that a balancing of the hardships tips ‘decidedly’ in favor of the 
moving party.” Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Register.com, 
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 424 (2d Cir. 2004)).
135. Id. at 21-22 (citing Foodcomm Int’l v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 303 (7th 
Cir. 2003)); see also Jones v. Infocure Corp., 310 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2002).
136. See, e.g., STOLL-DEBELL, DEMPSEY & DEMPSEY, supra note 127, at 22 
(citing Foodcomm Int’l, 328 F.3d at 303); see also Jones, 310 F.3d at 534.
137. See Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, at 
*11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013).
138. See supra INTRODUCTION.
139. For an additional case discussing the exhaustion requirement in the 
context of a school closing, see Comb v. Benji’s Special Education Academy, Inc., 
745 F. Supp. 2d 755, 771-72 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is required absent a showing that exhaustion would be futile 
before bringing the action for a preliminary injunction in the context of a school 
closing).
140. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1.
141. In a second lawsuit, parents of African-American students brought an 
action against CPS claiming that the school closing would result in African-
American students suffering “a greater degree of harm” as compared to their non-
African-American peers. See id.
142. See id.
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programs, compared to their peers in general education, by not 
providing adequate time at the new schools for the implementation 
of the IEPs of students classified as disabled under the IDEA.143 The 
second suit alleged that the school closings would destroy the 
students’ relationships with teachers and peers, prevent the students 
from having their IEPs revised, and place their children in new 
schools with unfamiliar and dangerous commutes.144 Due to the 
looming school start date, the parties agreed to consolidate the 
claims, and the court granted an expedited discovery motion to be 
followed by a four-day preliminary injunction hearing, all over a 
mere month before the start of school.145
For the more than 2,000 students with disabilities within CPS 
that would be impacted by the school closings, the district took a 
number of steps—exposed through discovery and witness 
testimony—in an attempt to ensure IDEA compliance.146 The district 
held an outreach campaign for families with students with 
disabilities, where it hosted meetings at each closing school to 
explain the transition process147 and reached out to each family to 
answer questions related specifically to each family’s child.148 The 
special education department reviewed the IEP of each student 
affected by the closures to ensure that proper supports were in 
place,149 and the faculty in the schools receiving new students with 
disabilities was required to complete training programs over the 
summer that included customized disability awareness training.150
The district went so far as to take photographs of the closing school 
143. See id. at *2 (stating that the closing schedule would “not allow enough 
time for administrators in the new schools to ensure that the IEPs of disabled 
students are properly revised and implemented” and that there would not “be 
sufficient time for students with disabilities to adequately acclimate to their new 
schools in violation of the [IDEA and Americans with Disabilities Act]”).
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at *9 (stating that the district took steps to ensure that “(a) 
students with disabilities know their new school and feel welcome; (b) the staff 
understands the needs of students; (c) instructional supports and equipment are in 
place and teachers know how to use them; (d) schools have provided activities to 
support the transitions; (e) the students are scheduled in accordance with their IEPs; 
and (f) any necessary IEP revisions have been completed” (citing Hr’g Tr. at 788-
89; Hr’g Exs. 24, 29)).
147. See id. (citing Hr’g Tr. at 807-08, 814).
148. See id. (citing Hr’g Tr. at 814-15).
149. See id. at *10 (citing Hr’g Tr. at 828-29, 835).
150. See id. (citing Hr’g Tr. at 794-95).
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classrooms in an attempt to replicate them in the new schools,151
down to matching the color of the computer cords for certain 
students’ classrooms.152 Despite the unveiling of these 
comprehensive steps during discovery and the hearing, the parents 
continued through the trial-like hearing process, proclaiming that the 
district was neither taking the time nor putting the resources into 
ensuring full IDEA compliance during the school closings.153
Though the entire case was completed within just three months, 
it resulted in a comprehensive factual record supplemented by 
numerous expert witnesses on which the court relied.154 The court 
provided a nearly thirty-page opinion discussing how the facts in the 
case corresponded to the required elements for the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction.155 Despite this detailed attention to the merits 
of the claims, the court relied in part on the parents’ failure to first 
exhaust the administrative remedies in rejecting their motion for a 
preliminary injunction.156 Without first exhausting the IDEA 
administrative remedies, the parents could not demonstrate the 
absence of an adequate remedy for the alleged harms, an essential 
element for a preliminary injunction.157 The court nonetheless 
evaluated the remaining elements and held that the parents were not 
likely to succeed on the merits based on the presented evidence158—
even though the single fact that the parents failed to exhaust the 
administrative remedies was alone dispositive to defeat the 
preliminary injunction claim.159
151. See id. (citing Hr’g Tr. at 439, 800-01).
152. See id. at *15 (citing Hr’g Tr. at 800-01).
153. See id. at *1-2.
154. See id. at *2, *29.
155. See id. at *1-29.
156. See id. at *19, *28.
157. See id. at *28 (“Thus, Plaintiffs’ have failed to demonstrate that the 
administrative review process cannot provide a remedy for the harms they allege. 
Plaintiffs have failed, therefore, to show that there is not an adequate remedy at law 
for their ADA claims.”). While this aspect of the opinion discussed the plaintiffs’ 
claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the court noted that the 
parents were nonetheless making a claim of an IDEA violation. See id. at *27.
158. See id. at *27-28 (stating that the parents failed to present “persuasive 
evidence that the harm they will suffer without an injunction is greater than the harm 
[that] others will suffer, including other students, if an injunction was granted”).
159. See id. at *27.
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C. Without Exhausting, an IDEA Action “Must Fail”
As the CPS case illustrates, courts adamantly require that IDEA 
disputes proceed through the exhaustion process prior to the claim 
having merit in civil court.160 The administrative hearing process 
allows education professionals to have “the first crack” at resolving a 
parent’s complaint.161 Without allowing for this administrative first 
crack, the claims under the IDEA “must fail.”162 Even when it is 
unclear whether the administrative process is able to provide an 
adequate remedy for the underlying IDEA violation, exhaustion is 
typically still required.163
Courts reason that requiring exhaustion when relief is uncertain 
is appropriate because parents cannot be certain that no 
administrative relief exists without first going through the 
administrative remedy process.164 When the alleged IDEA violations 
have their roots in educational services, relief is hypothetically 
available under the IDEA because the statute provides remedies to 
educational issues by way of the hearing process.165 Litigating 
whether administrative exhaustion is required can be an elongated 
process and consumes scarce judicial resources.166 As the Ninth 
Circuit noted, parties in an IDEA case litigated whether exhaustion 
should be required over a four-year period.167 The court’s dissent 
pointed out that a resolution on the underlying IDEA question would 
have been reached far more quickly without the preliminary 
exhaustion dispute.168 Courts often strictly enforce the 
160. See id.
161. See Neil F. ex rel. Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 
1996).
162. See Comb v. Benji’s Special Educ. Acad., No. H-10-3498, 2012 WL 
1067395, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2012) (“There is no evidence to support an 
exemption from the administrative exhaustion requirement. Thus, the Parent–
Plaintiffs’ claims under both the IDEA and Section 1983 must fail.”).
163. See Ellenberg ex rel. S.E. v. N.M. Military Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1276 
(10th Cir. 2007).
164. See Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 993.
165. See id. (“[When b]oth the genesis and the manifestations of the problem 
are education[,] the IDEA offers comprehensive educational solutions; we conclude, 
therefore, that at least in principle relief is available under the IDEA.”).
166. See generally Rita S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of 
Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (Clifton, J., dissenting).
167. See id.
168. See id. (“I cannot help but note that this lawsuit concerns a schedule 
announced at the beginning of the 2000–01 school year, more than four years ago. 
By inviting appeal of district court determinations that plaintiffs should be required 
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administrative-exhaustion requirement regardless of the time 
consumed litigating its applicability and despite that enforcement 
will result in the claim’s summary dismissal based not on its 
underlying merits.169
D. Recognizing the Limits of Administrative Remedies
Despite the strict IDEA procedural mandates,170 there are 
instances in which courts recognize the limits of the administrative-
exhaustion requirement. The Eighth Circuit in Barron ex rel. D.B. v. 
South Dakota Board of Regents held that parents challenging the 
closure of a school were not required to exhaust the administrative 
remedies before bringing a motion for a preliminary injunction due 
to an alleged IDEA violation.171 The parents in Barron sought to 
prevent the state from moving programs for their deaf or hard-of-
hearing children to a different district.172 After acknowledging that 
the IDEA typically requires administrative exhaustion prior to 
bringing a civil action,173 the court held that such a requirement in 
this case was not appropriate.174 In waiving administrative 
exhaustion, the court reasoned that if the parents’ underlying IDEA 
claim had merit, then the administrative hearing process was unlikely 
to provide adequate relief.175 When, assuming that the IDEA claim is 
meritorious, the hearing officer would be unable to issue the 
necessary relief for the violation, Congress specified that exhaustion 
should not be required.176 Thus, as a practical matter, it was 
improbable that an administrative hearing officer could require the 
to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding in court, our decision here will 
likely encourage more court activity rather than less. That is not what Congress 
intended.”).
169. See, e.g., id.; Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 992-93.
170. See supra Section I.B.
171. See 655 F.3d 787, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2011).
172. See id. at 791.
173. See id. at 792 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2006)).
174. See id. at 793.
175. See id. at 792 (citing Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 
297 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2002)).
176. See id. (“‘Congress specified that exhaustion is not necessary if . . . “it 
is improbable that adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative 
remedies.”‘” (quoting Murphy, 297 F.3d at 199)). The court went on to state that the 
administrative remedies process is appropriate for questions related to “‘any matter[] 
relating to the identification, evaluation or educational placement of a child with a 
disability, or the provision of [a free and appropriate education] to the child.’” See 
id. at 792-93 (quoting S.D. ADMIN. R. 24:05:30:07.01 (2007)).
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district to reverse its decision to change the location of the students’ 
program—the hearing officer is generally limited to rectifying issues 
only relating to the contents of a student’s IEP.177 After waiving the 
exhaustion requirement, the court proceeded without delay to 
adjudicate the merits of the claimed IDEA violation.178
The Second Circuit came to a similar conclusion when it 
recognized that case law carved out a futility exception for requiring 
administrative exhaustion.179 In waiving the exhaustion requirement, 
the court in Heldman v. Sobol relied on an exception used in 
circumstances in which exhaustion would be futile—when the 
administrative procedures cannot provide an adequate remedy.180 In 
Heldman, the court waived mandatory administrative exhaustion 
because the hearing officer did not have the power to alter the state 
statutory procedure allegedly violating the IDEA.181 When the 
administrative hearing officer lacks the authority to alter the alleged 
harm, both Barron and Heldman indicate that requiring exhaustion is 
a mere exercise in futility and should, therefore, be waived.182
An additional explicit method of waiving the exhaustion 
requirement under the IDEA is through the Act’s “stay-put” 
provision.183 While this provision is not applicable to questions of a 
177. See id. at 793 (“We agree with the district court that [i]n consideration 
of the administrative scheme, and as a practical matter, it may be more than 
improbable that a hearing officer could ultimately enforce an order to the Board of 
Regents to reverse its policy of cutting programs at the school’s physical location 
and out-sourcing services to home school districts.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).
178. See id. at 792-93.
179. See Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 1992).
180. See id.
181. See id. at 159 (“Resort to the New York state administrative process in 
this case would be futile. Heldman claims that the NYSED regulation specifying the 
hearing officer selection procedure violates the mandate of IDEA. Because the 
regulation implements a New York statute, neither the Commissioner nor the 
assigned hearing officer has the authority to alter the procedure; therefore, it would 
be an exercise in futility to require Heldman to exhaust the state administrative 
remedies.” (citing Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, 1086 (D. Neb. 1980))).
182. See id.; Barron, 655 F.3d at 793.
183. See Guardians Ad Litem ex rel. N.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 
1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Exhausting the administrative process would be 
inadequate because the stay-put provision (and therefore the preliminary injunction) 
is designed precisely to prevent harm while the proceeding is ongoing.” (citing 
Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 
2002))).
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preliminary injunction related to a school closing,184 its underlying 
justifications for waiving exhaustion are insightful.185 The stay-put 
provision is a procedural safeguard requiring that during the 
pendency of any proceeding relating to a change in a student’s 
educational placement, the student shall remain in his or her “then-
current educational placement.”186 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
exhaustion requirement need not be met when seeking to enforce the 
stay-put provision of the IDEA.187 The stay-put provision’s purpose, 
similar to a preliminary injunction, is to prevent the alleged harm 
while the underlying issue is resolved.188 A hearing officer lacks the 
power to order a district to retain a student in his or her “then-current 
educational placement,” so requiring administrative exhaustion 
would be insufficient.189 The stay-put provision protects students 
when the time-sensitive nature of an action should control, as the 
potential harm will have already occurred if the student is forced to 
change his or her educational placement during the dispute regarding 
the appropriateness of that change.190 The critical question 
184. The stay-put provision is very limited in its application. See infra notes 
186, 190, and accompanying text.
185. See infra Section III.D.
186. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2012). A student’s “educational placement” 
means the student’s general educational programming, and a change in such a 
placement “relates to whether the student is moved from one type of program—i.e., 
regular class—to another type—i.e., home instruction.” N.D., 600 F.3d at 1116. “A 
change in the educational placement can also” occur “when there is a significant 
change in the student’s program even if the student remains in the same setting.” Id.
Educational placement does not, however, refer to “the ‘bricks and mortar’ of the 
specific school.” T.Y. ex rel. T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d
Cir. 2009). For a detailed overview and critique of the stay-put provision, see 
Valerie Boland, Note, Courts Misinterpret “Stay Put” Provision of Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act: Did Congress Really Intend to Take Services Away from 
Children with Disabilities?, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 1007 (2009).
187. N.D., 600 F.3d at 1110-11 (adopting the framework of Murphy, 297 
F.3d at 199-200).
188. See id. (“Exhausting the administrative process would be inadequate 
because the stay-put provision (and therefore the preliminary injunction) is designed 
precisely to prevent harm while the proceeding is ongoing.” (citing Murphy, 297 
F.3d at 199-200)).
189. See id. (citing Murphy, 297 F.3d at 199-200); see also 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i) (2006).
190. See N.D., 600 F.3d at 1110-11 (“The stay-put provision recognizes the 
need for the child to keep her current educational placement as the administrative 
process tries to sort out alternatives. If the child is moved from the current 
placement during the process, then the deprivation of the right has occurred. The 
completion of the administrative process cannot remedy the harm. Access to the 
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concerning waiving the exhaustion requirement in the stay-put 
context is whether the delay caused by the administrative-exhaustion 
process should be subjugated by the immediacy of the alleged 
harm.191
A preliminary injunction is a powerful tool, but without first 
exhausting the IDEA administrative remedies a court is unlikely to 
issue such an order.192 The CPS case, Swan, illustrates the 
determinative role that administrative exhaustion can play in 
bringing a civil action,193 though requiring administrative exhaustion 
is not appropriate in all circumstances.194 Much stands in the way 
between a parent and his or her ability to require a district to comply 
with the IDEA.195 These demanding IDEA requirements work 
together to create an administrative-exhaustion barrier that is 
difficult to overcome in a timely manner.196
III. THE EXHAUSTION BARRIER
When parents bring an action based on an alleged IDEA 
violation for a preliminary injunction to temporarily prevent a school 
from closing, time is of the essence.197 The current mandatory IDEA 
administrative-exhaustion framework is unsuitable in instances of an 
imminent school closing. The limitations of the existing IDEA 
structure, ranging from the narrow powers of an administrative 
officer198 to the restrictive nature of the statute’s jurisdictional-giving 
preliminary injunction is essential to vindicate this particular IDEA right.” (citation 
omitted) (citing Murphy, 297 F.3d at 199-200)).
191. See Komninos ex rel. Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 
F.3d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he critical question is whether there is such 
immediacy of harm as to preclude delay until the administrative process is 
completed. . . . A showing at the time the suit is filed in the district court, however, 
that the [harm to the student] will be irreversible would demonstrate irreparable 
harm and would relieve plaintiffs from the obligation to finish the administrative 
process before seeking judicial relief.”).
192. See supra Section II.C.
193. See supra Section II.B.
194. See supra Section II.D.
195. See infra Part III.
196. See infra Part III.
197. See Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (“On May 23, 2013, the [c]ourt granted the parties leave to 
proceed with expedited discovery and scheduled a four-day preliminary injunction 
hearing for July 16, 2013.”).
198. See infra Section III.A.
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language,199 leave parents with limited options for seeking IDEA 
enforcement. Further buttressing the limitations of mandatory 
administrative exhaustion in this context is the void of the underlying 
rationales in support for the exhaustion process.200 Courts have 
shown their willingness to recognize the boundaries of mandatory 
exhaustion by carving out narrow exceptions in instances of the 
IDEA’s stay-put provision and imminent school closings.201 Against
this backdrop, it becomes clear that a modification to the IDEA is 
needed to alleviate the current exhaustion barrier.202 Without 
addressing these obstacles to IDEA enforcement, there is a serious 
risk that an otherwise meritorious IDEA claim will go unaddressed 
by the courts due to a parent’s inability to directly bring a civil 
action.203
A. Limited Powers of an Administrative Hearing Officer
Administrative hearing officers’ powers are far from 
unlimited.204 The officers’ ability to issue orders is generally limited 
to determining the sufficiency of a student’s disability classification 
and the implementation of the IDEA’s requirements and to ordering 
districts to take corrective action to come into compliance with the 
Act.205 When an administrative hearing officer lacks the power to 
order an appropriate remedy, requiring administrative exhaustion is 
not proper.206 In Barron ex rel. D.B. v. South Dakota Board of 
Regents, the Eighth Circuit waived the exhaustion requirement for 
this very reason—the inability of the hearing officer to issue the 
necessary remedy made exhaustion, as a practical matter, 
unsuitable.207 If the underlying IDEA violation claimed by the 
199. See infra Section III.B.
200. See infra Section III.C.
201. See infra Section III.D.
202. See infra Subsection III.E.1.
203. See supra Section II.C.
204. See Zirkel, supra note 70, at 9.
205. See id. While the hearing officer has the power to take these actions, 
this power is largely restricted to ordering the district to take steps relating 
specifically to the student’s educational services—it does not, however, extend to 
ordering the district to take wider action, such as unilaterally stopping a district from 
closing a school. See id.
206. See Barron ex rel. D.B. v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655 F.3d 787, 792 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that the parents were not required to exhaust because, if 
their position was well founded and the Board’s actions violated the IDEA, adequate 
relief likely could not have been obtained through the administrative process.”).
207. See id. at 793.
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plaintiffs was occurring, then the court held that the hearing officer 
would not have within his or her power the ability to prevent a 
district’s school board from cutting school programs.208
The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in waiving exhaustion in 
Barron is telling because it indicates that exhaustion should not be 
required when, in the event that the underlying claim is accurate, the 
hearing officer’s authority to order the necessary remedy is 
improbable.209 In reviewing an administrative officer’s powers, 
absent from the list is the ability to issue a preliminary injunction to 
temporarily stop a district from closing a school or to reverse an 
initiated school closing.210 Using the Barron reasoning, then, if a 
parent seeks a preliminary injunction due to an alleged IDEA 
violation during the school-closing procedures, then exhaustion 
should be waived because it is improbable that the administrative 
officer can issue such an order.211
Courts should apply the Barron reasoning and waive 
exhaustion at the outset of an action seeking a preliminary injunction 
for an alleged IDEA violation for school closings.212 If exhaustion is 
not waived and the hearing officer concludes that the district must 
reevaluate its closing procedures to comply with the IDEA, thereby 
requiring a temporary hold on the district’s school-closure plans,213
then the officer simply has no authority to take this necessary 
action.214 Adopting this approach is one step to avoid the unnecessary 
and damaging time delay of requiring exhaustion in the context of an 
imminent school closing.215
208. See id. at 792; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
209. See Barron, 655 F.3d at 792.
210. See Zirkel, supra note 70, at 9; see also Barron, 655 F.3d at 792.
211. See Barron, 655 F.3d at 793.
212. See id.
213. The plaintiffs in Swan sought, among other things, for CPS to 
reevaluate its school closing procedures. See Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-
24, 2013 WL 4401439, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (“According to Plaintiffs, the 
schedule for the closures will not allow enough time for administrators in the new 
schools to ensure that the IEPs of disabled students are properly revised and 
implemented, nor will there be sufficient time for students with disabilities to 
adequately acclimate to their new schools in violation of the [IDEA and Americans 
with Disabilities Act].”).
214. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
215. See Rita S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 
384 F.3d 1205, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (Clifton, J., dissenting) (noting the extensive 
time that exhaustion litigation can require).
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B. The IDEA’s Jurisdictional Dilemma: The “Party Aggrieved” 
Requirement
If an administrative hearing officer does order a form of 
relief,216 there are great restrictions on a parent’s ability to ensure that 
the district complies with the order.217 The proper remedy for a 
district failing to follow an administrative order is for the parent to 
seek enforcement of that order.218 The only available avenue for 
enforcement under the IDEA, however, is for the parent to reengage 
the administrative hearing process, as the parent is not the party 
aggrieved—depriving a court of jurisdiction to hear the claim.219
Failing to restart the administrative-exhaustion process will likely 
result in a court dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction based on 
the IDEA’s explicit statutory language.220
The IDEA’s jurisdictional-giving language provides that only 
the “party aggrieved” can bring an enforcement action to the 
courts.221 Norris v. Board of Education illustrates how the party 
aggrieved requirement works in practice.222 The parent of a student 
with disabilities in Norris initially exhausted the administrative 
remedies as required by the IDEA and received a favorable hearing 
outcome.223 Yet, due to the district’s noncompliance with the 
administrative order, the parent brought an action in court to require 
216. The IDEA allows an administrative hearing officer to issue a form of 
remedy that neither party requested but that the officer believes would be 
appropriate under the IDEA. See, e.g., Neil F. ex rel. Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 
F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The [IDEA] speaks of available relief, and what 
relief is ‘available’ does not necessarily depend on what the aggrieved party 
wants.”).
217. See infra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
218. See Norris ex rel. Norris v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1468 (S.D. 
Ind. 1992) (“When a school district ignores a valid final order, the proper remedy is 
enforcement of that order.”).
219. See id.
220. See id. at 1469.
221. See Wasserman, supra note 21, at 388-89; see also Hunter ex rel.
Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 278 n.10 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The 
argument against the applicability of [20 U.S.C.] § 1415(e)(2) would be that the 
Hunters, in seeking judicial assistance to enforce portions of the IDEA 
administrative decision, were not persons ‘aggrieved by the findings and decision’ 
within the meaning of § 1415(e)(2), but rather persons aggrieved by the failure of 
the local school officials to implement the decision. The counter-argument would be 
that the Hunters were ‘aggrieved’ by the fact that the administrative orders favorable 
to the Hunters contained no enforcement mechanisms.”).
222. See Norris, 797 F. Supp. at 1467-68.
223. See id. at 1457-58.
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the district to conform to the hearing officer’s determination.224
Although the parent faced an uncooperative district, the court 
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the parent was not 
the party aggrieved under the IDEA’s strict jurisdictional-giving 
language.225
Requiring a parent to be the party aggrieved by an 
administrative hearing’s outcome places a soaring hurdle in the path 
of a parent seeking IDEA enforcement in the process of a school 
closing.226 While some on the bench argue that this requirement 
“does not mean that their claims will be unfairly or improperly 
denied” because court review is eventually available,227 this 
continuous exhaustion requirement “make[s] no sense” in 
application.228 When a parent complies with the IDEA by initially 
completing the exhaustion process, but cannot get the district to 
comply with the hearing officer’s order, the only available avenue to 
seek enforcement is through additional administrative exhaustion—
meanwhile, the underlying IDEA violation continues unresolved.229
When a district is in the midst of planning or implementing a 
school closing, there is no time to engage in the cycle of exhaustion 
as required by the IDEA. Restarting the exhaustion process and 
litigating whether more exhaustion is required before a court has 
jurisdiction is very time consuming.230 Yet, courts continue enforcing 
the strict exhaustion requirement by reading the IDEA’s 
jurisdictional language narrowly.231 When faced head-on with this 
circular exhaustion requirement, the Norris court rejected the 
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1468-69 (“Plainly, a complaint that a school ignored a hearing 
officer’s order may be remedied through the administrative process. Plaintiffs failed 
to seek this type of required remedy.”).
226. See id. (dismissing an IDEA claim for lack of jurisdiction because the 
parent received a favorable decision through the administrative hearing process, 
though the district subsequently failed to comply with the order).
227. See Rita S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 
384 F.3d 1205, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (Clifton, J., dissenting).
228. See Wasserman, supra note 21, at 389.
229. See id.
230. See Christopher S., 384 F.3d at 1220 (noting that litigation concerning 
the alleged IDEA violation and its exhaustion requirement lasted for more than four 
years).
231. See Norris, 797 F. Supp. at 1468-69 (requiring that a party seeking to 
enforce a district to comply with an administrative hearing officer’s order must re-
exhaust the administrative process because the plaintiff was not the party 
aggrieved); see also Hunter ex rel. Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 
272, 278 n.10 (3d Cir. 1996).
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parent’s argument that the party aggrieved requirement was a “catch-
22”232 situation.233 The parent argued that she could not have her case 
heard in front of an adjudicative body that had the power to enforce 
compliance with the IDEA, as her only option was more ineffective 
administrative hearings.234
When the date of a school closing grows closer, this exhaustion 
cycle is the epitome of a catch-22. On the one hand, a parent 
complies with the IDEA by exhausting the administrative remedies 
in which a favorable ruling is provided; but, on the other hand, that 
parent cannot have the favorable order enforced by an adjudicative 
body that possesses the power to require the district to comply.235
Consequently, a parent is forced to return to the proven ineffective 
administrative process.236 All the while, the student’s access to a free 
and appropriate education, which the IDEA is designed to ensure,237
is left in the questionable state that motivated the initial lawsuit while 
the school-closing schedule forges ahead. This procedural exhaustion 
requirement allows a district to exhaust the parent into giving up the 
fight for the student’s IDEA rights during the school-closing 
process.238 There is simply not sufficient time to engage in multiple 
rounds of administrative exhaustion when a school is slated to close 
232. A catch-22 is “[a] dilemma or difficult circumstance from which there 
is no escape because of mutually conflicting or dependent conditions.” OXFORD 
DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/
catch-22 (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
233. See Norris, 797 F. Supp. at 1468 (“Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that they 
were in a ‘catch-22’ situation because they were not ‘aggrieved’ by any order but 
rather faced a school district unwilling to abide by a valid order.”).
234. See id.
235. The parent is not the party aggrieved, as required by the IDEA, so a 
court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case. See, e.g., id.
236. See, e.g., Neil F. ex rel. Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 993 
(7th Cir. 1996) (“The case is remanded with instructions to dismiss for failure to use 
the IDEA’s administrative remedies.”); Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 
2013 WL 4401439, at *27-28 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (“[Plaintiffs] must exhaust 
the IDEA’s administrative process before coming to federal court, unless exhaustion 
would have been futile. . . . Thus, Plaintiffs’ [sic] have failed to demonstrate that the 
administrative review process cannot provide a remedy for the harms they allege. 
Plaintiffs have failed, therefore, to show that there is not an adequate remedy at law 
for their [IDEA] claims.” (citation omitted)).
237. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
238. See Rita S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 
384 F.3d 1205, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (Clifton, J., dissenting) (noting that litigation 
concerning the alleged IDEA violation and its exhaustion requirement lasted for 
more than four years).
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within mere months of an initiated action for a preliminary 
injunction due to an alleged IDEA violation.239
C. Absent Justifications for Mandatory Exhaustion
When the underlying justifications for mandatory 
administrative exhaustion do not substantially benefit a civil 
proceeding,240 courts will waive the exhaustion requirement.241 As 
J.S. v. Attica Central Schools noted, in non-textbook IDEA cases—
those that go beyond mere questions of the contents of a student’s 
IEP242—the exhaustion requirement is not necessarily applicable, 
particularly when the purposes behind exhaustion are not 
furthered.243 Seeking a claim for a preliminary injunction for an 
alleged IDEA violation in the face of a looming school closing is a 
non-textbook case, making the applicability of the underlying 
rationales for mandatory exhaustion less than certain.244
As the CPS case, Swan v. Board of Education of Chicago,
illustrates, courts have the capacity to properly adjudicate the 
underlying merits of a preliminary injunction claim without the 
assistance of the administrative agency’s educational experts.245 In 
Swan, the parties provided the court with the necessary technical 
educational information by employing an array of educational 
experts—including experts in the areas of general education, special 
education, school-building utilization, and school transition plans for 
239. See id.; see also Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *2 (allowing an expedited 
preliminary injunction hearing due to the looming start of the academic school year).
240. See supra Section II.D; see also Christopher S., 384 F.3d at 1209 
(majority opinion) (“The requirement that aggrieved parties exhaust their 
administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit . . . ‘affords full exploration of 
technical educational issues, furthers development of a complete factual record, and 
promotes judicial efficiency by giving these agencies the first opportunity to correct 
shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled children.’” (quoting Hoeft 
v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992))).
241. See Bailey ex rel. J.B. v. Avilla R-XIII Sch. Dist., 721 F.3d 588, 596 
(8th Cir. 2013); N.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 
2004); Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303.
242. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
243. See J.S., 386 F.3d at 112-13, 115.
244. See id. at 114-15. When the claim is regarding the timeline, procedures, 
and student placement related to a school closing, the questions go beyond a 
textbook case consisting solely of issues regarding the contents of an IEP. See supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
245. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
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students.246 In all, seventeen experts and witnesses testified during 
the four-day hearing.247 Moreover, the hearing created an 877-page 
factual record for the court to rely upon in making its ruling.248 In 
rendering its twenty-nine page opinion, the court made no mention of 
a want of a better understanding of the technical educational issues 
or a more comprehensive factual record.249 It is clear from Swan that 
courts are capable of gleaning a sufficient understanding of the 
technical educational issues presented and developing a detailed 
factual record of the pertinent educational issues in order to issue an 
informed ruling.250 Thus, when it comes to an alleged IDEA violation 
due to a looming school closing, the case for requiring administrative 
exhaustion prior to bringing a civil case severely weakens without 
the support of its underlying rationales.251
246. The experts and witnesses that testified are (1) Pauline Lipman, 
professor of educational policy studies at the University of Illinois in Chicago; (2) 
Kristine Mayle, former special education teacher at CPS; (3) Mandi Swan, parent of 
a student with a learning disability; (4) Lucy Witte, who provided an opinion 
concerning the impact of the closing of forty-nine elementary schools on students 
with disabilities; (5) Sarah Judith Hainds, member of the Chicago Education 
Facilities Task Force; (6) Laurie Hines Siegel, who testified on the impact of the 
school closings on the special education population at CPS; (7) John Martin 
Hagedorn, expert on gang activity in Chicago; (8) Woods Bowman, who analyzed 
the Board of Education’s financial justifications for closing the schools; (9) Sherise 
Renee McDaniel, parent of an allegedly impacted student; (10) Pavlyn Jankov, 
Chicago Teachers Union research facilitator; (11) Markay Winston, chief officer for 
the CPS office of diverse learner supports and services; (12) Adam Lee Anderson, 
officer of portfolio planning and strategy for the Chicago Board of Education; (13) 
Ginger Ostro, budget and grants officer for the Chicago Board of Education; (14) 
Annette Gurley, chief officer for teaching and learning for the Chicago Board of 
Education; (15) Jadine Chou, chief safety and security officer for the Chicago Board 
of Education; (16) Tom Tyrrell, Deputy Chief Administrative Officer for the 
Chicago Board of Education; and (17) Rebecca Clark, director of student supports in 
the office of diverse learners, supports, and services for CPS. See Transcript of 
Proceedings - Preliminary Injunction Hearing Before the Honorable John Z. Lee, 




249. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401439 at *1-29.
250. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
251. See N.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 112-15 (2d Cir. 
2004) (waiving administrative exhaustion due to the inapplicability of its supportive 
rationales).
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D. Applying the “Stay-Put” Rationales to Imminent School Closings
With the inapplicability of the traditional supportive 
justifications for mandatory administrative exhaustion,252 the case for 
waiving such exhaustion is further supported by considering the 
rationales for waiving exhaustion in the IDEA’s stay-put provision. 
The stay-put provision253 is only applicable when the student’s 
education placement is in question.254 Yet, the concept underlying the 
stay-put provision is informative when approaching the IDEA 
administrative-exhaustion requirement relating to imminent school 
closings. The stay-put provision’s design is to ensure that a student is 
not harmed during an adjudicative proceeding concerning the merits 
of an IDEA claim.255 As the Ninth Circuit recently noted when 
presented with a stay-put provision question, because of the “time-
sensitive nature” of determining a student’s proper educational 
placement, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.256
In light of the time sensitivity, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
defendant’s argument in favor of requiring exhaustion, which 
presupposed that the administrative-exhaustion process might be 
effective in resolving the dispute, was not persuasive.257 It is 
essential, the court noted, that the plaintiff in this time-sensitive 
situation be given the ability to directly bring a court action 
concerning the merits of the IDEA claim.258
The reasoning employed by the Ninth Circuit to waive 
administrative exhaustion in instances of the stay-put provision is 
extendable to cases concerning the administrative-exhaustion 
requirement in circumstances of imminent school closings. The 
claim’s time sensitivity and mere presupposition of the hearing 
officer’s ability to remedy the harm was sufficiently persuasive for 
the Ninth Circuit to waive the administrative-exhaustion process.259
252. See supra Sections III.A-C.
253. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
254. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2012).
255. The harm in question concerns the harm to the student via a violation of
his IDEA right to a free and appropriate education. See supra note 188 and 
accompanying text.
256. See Guardians Ad Litem ex rel. N.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 
1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2002)).
257. See id. (stating that “[t]his argument is a non-sequitur”).
258. See id. at 1111 (“Access to the preliminary injunction is essential to 
vindicate this particular IDEA right.” (citing Murphy, 297 F.3d at 200)).
259. See id. at 1110 (citing Murphy, 297 F.3d at 199-200).
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The dangers adverted by waiving exhaustion in stay-put cases 
similarly exist in cases of alleged IDEA violations in contexts of 
impending school closings. When a school is slated to shut down in 
mere months, time is of the essence to resolve an IDEA-violation 
question concerning the transition.260 Yet, in the face of an elongated 
exhaustion process,261 courts still adhere to the exhaustion 
requirement in order to allow the administrative process to have the 
“first crack” at resolving the problem,262 even when a hearing 
officer’s ability to order a solution is far from certain263 or merely 
hypothetical.264 When the risk exists that the school will close prior 
to the completion of the administrative process, the uncertain nature 
of the administrative process’s ability to issue an enforceable 
solution is a similarly unpersuasive rationale for requiring 
exhaustion.265 Courts should follow the rationale employed in 
questions concerning the stay-put provision in order to evade the 
time-sensitive harm to students that is similarly in question when a 
student has an IDEA challenge due to a soon-to-close school.266
When a broad view is taken toward questions of the 
administrative-exhaustion requirement for IDEA claims, it becomes 
clear that exhaustion is not appropriate in many IDEA contexts.267 It 
may be the case that the presence of a single rationale for waiving 
IDEA exhaustion when a school is slated to close is an insufficient 
justification for extending a waiver. There are, however, at least four 
260. See Rita S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 
384 F.3d 1205, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (Clifton, J., dissenting) (noting that litigation 
concerning the alleged IDEA violation and its exhaustion requirement lasted for 
more than four years); see also Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 
4401439, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (allowing an expedited preliminary 
injunction hearing due to the looming start of the academic school year).
261. See supra Section I.B (discussing the procedural requirements of the 
administrative hearing process); see also Christopher S., 384 F.3d at 1220 (noting 
that the case at bar disputed the exhaustion process for more than four years).
262. See Neil F. ex rel. Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 
1996) (“[U]nder the IDEA, educational professionals are supposed to have at least 
the first crack at formulating a plan to overcome the consequences of educational 
shortfalls.”).
263. See id. at 993 (noting that the parents–plaintiffs cannot know that no 
remedy exists without first going through the administrative process and “that at 
least in principle relief is available under the IDEA”).
264. See Douglass v. District of Columbia, 750 F. Supp. 2d 54, 63 (D.D.C. 
2010) (citing Riley v. Ambach, 668 F.2d 635, 640 (2d Cir. 1981)).
265. See Guardians Ad Litem ex rel. N.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 
1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010).
266. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Sections III.A-D.
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applicable factors—the limited powers of the administrative hearing 
officer,268 the court’s absent jurisdiction for enforcement,269 the void 
of the traditional administrative-exhaustion justifications,270 and the 
similarities to the stay-put provision’s rationales271—that courts have 
relied upon to waive mandatory exhaustion in IDEA cases.272 Taken 
together, these rationales present a strong case for similarly waiving 
mandatory IDEA administrative exhaustion when presented with a 
time-sensitive situation of a slated school closure.273
E. 6,480,540 Reasons to Act and No Time to Wait
It took a national education funding crisis to uncover a 
procedural barrier to relief for families seeking injunctive action for 
an alleged IDEA violation in the face of a looming school closing.274
CPS’s historic decision to close forty-nine schools over a single 
summer275 posed serious challenges for ensuring compliance with the 
demanding IDEA.276 In the face of this pressure, however, CPS rose 
to the challenge—in doing so, it established the gold standard for 
dealing with mass school closings while simultaneously safeguarding 
students’ rights under the IDEA.277 The district went to great lengths 
to ensure that every student classified with a learning disability 
received personalized attention during the school transition, from 
reaching out to each family to discuss the transition and hosting 
meet-and-greets with new teachers to replicating students’ prior 
classrooms in the new schools.278 No step was too minor to ensure 
the smoothest possible transition for the students.279
268. See supra Section III.A.
269. See supra Section III.B.
270. See supra Section III.C.
271. See supra Section III.D.
272. See, e.g., Barron ex rel. D.B. v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655 F.3d 787, 792 
(8th Cir. 2011) (waiving exhaustion because of the hearing officer’s inability to 
issue an adequate remedy); N.S. ex rel. J.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 112-
15 (2d Cir. 2004) (waiving administrative exhaustion when exhaustion is not 
supported by its underlying rationales).
273. See supra Sections III.A-D.
274. See supra Section II.B.
275. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Section II.B.
277. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text (describing the 
comprehensive steps taken by CPS during the school closings and transitions).
278. See Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, at 
*10 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (“For example, all diverse learners from the closing 
schools are being asked to prepare written and pictorial presentations about 
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While the Swan court found that CPS’s comprehensive actions 
to comply with the IDEA made the motion for a preliminary 
injunction unlikely to prevail on the merits,280 the standard for school 
transitions set by CPS may be unreachable for many districts. Factors 
such as the number of students with disabilities affected by the move 
or the amount of resources dedicated specifically to IDEA 
compliance may impact a district’s ability to ensure complete 
compliance.281 While the parents would likely not have won on the 
merits of the claim in the CPS case, the presence of a future 
meritorious IDEA claim in the context of another school closing 
would currently be single-handedly rejected for want of 
administrative exhaustion.282
The CPS case exposes the determinative role that 
administrative exhaustion plays in a child’s right to have his or her 
IDEA claim heard by a body with the authority to take remedial 
measures in a time-conscious manner.283 The time to take corrective 
action is now—before a meritorious IDEA claim is summarily 
themselves to be shared with their new teachers at their receiving schools. Over the 
summer, receiving schools are scheduling a variety of events to introduce parents of 
diverse learners to the school, administrators and staff, such as tours, ‘meet-and-
greets,’ and information sessions with case managers. For students in cluster 
programs, CPS has taken photos of the closing school classrooms and is trying to 
replicate them as much as possible in the receiving school to aid in the transition. 
Additionally, schools receiving students in cluster programs are preparing social 
stories with pictures of the school and classrooms in a story book format to provide 
to transitioning students.” (internal citations omitted)).
279. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting that the district went 
so far as to match the color of the computer cords in the new classrooms with those 
in the closing schools).
280. See Swan, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1 (“Finally, when the low likelihood 
of success on the merits is considered in conjunction with the potential harm that 
injunctive relief would cause by prolonging the period of uncertainty for the 
impacted students and their parents, causing additional instability for the 
administration and staff at the schools, and preventing those students who may want 
the opportunity to attend higher performing schools from doing so, the balancing of 
equities weighs against preliminary injunctive relief. For these and the other 
reasons[,] . . . Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunction are denied.”).
281. See id. at *2 (stating that the parents–plaintiffs claimed that the 
expedited timeline to close the schools did not provide the district with adequate 
time for the district to allocate requisite resources to ensuring IDEA compliance for 
the thousands of impacted students classified as disabled).
282. See supra Section III.B (“The IDEA’s Jurisdictional Dilemma: The 
‘Party Aggrieved’ Requirement”).
283. See supra Section II.B (describing how the court rejected the parents’ 
claim for a preliminary injunction due in part to their failure to first exhaust the 
administrative remedies).
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dismissed amidst a school closing. By addressing the jurisdictional-
giving language in the IDEA284 and the administrative-exhaustion 
requirement in the context of an imminent school closing,285 the 
current barrier to IDEA relief can be lifted.
1. Eliminating Two Obstacles for IDEA Enforcement for 
Students with Disabilities
The first aspect of the IDEA that merits modification is the 
jurisdictional-giving language. Only the “party aggrieved” can 
currently bring a civil action after the issuance of an administrative 
order,286 resulting in parents being unable to seek judicial 
enforcement of the hearing officer’s order.287 To remedy this 
disparity, jurisdiction should be provided to courts to hear claims 
brought by parents seeking IDEA enforcement when a district fails 
to comply with an administrative order.288 This remedy ensures that 
the merit of a hearing officer’s order has the backing of the courts 
and can be timely enforced.289 In the absence of this jurisdiction, the 
only remedy currently available for parents is to reengage the proven 
ineffective administrative process, all while the school closing and 
IDEA violation persist.290
The second necessary IDEA change addresses the mandatory 
administrative-exhaustion provision. When a school is slated to close 
in mere months, there is neither adequate time291 nor the underlying 
rationales292 to exhaust the IDEA administrative remedies prior to a 
school closing. The IDEA ought to be modified to expressly waive 
mandatory administrative exhaustion when a claim is brought for a 
temporary or preliminary injunction to prevent a school from 
closing.293 To help ensure that this waiver is not applied to contexts 
not intended, it should be limited to claims brought to rectify alleged 
284. See infra Subsection III.E.1 (proposing a remedy to the “party 
aggrieved” language of the IDEA).
285. See infra Subsection III.E.1 (proposing a modification to the 
administrative-exhaustion requirement in a school-closing context).
286. The IDEA provides courts with jurisdiction only to hear a claim from 
the “party aggrieved.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2012).
287. See supra Section III.A.
288. See supra Section III.A.
289. See supra Section III.A.
290. See supra Section III.A.
291. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Section III.C.
293. See supra Section II.C.
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IDEA violations that result from a proposed or an initiated school 
closing.
Both of these changes are needed to ensure full IDEA 
compliance, particularly in the fast-paced environment of a looming 
school closing.294 These proposed changes would allow the parents to 
argue the merits of their IDEA-related preliminary injunction claim, 
rather than spending their and the court’s time and resources first 
litigating whether a court has jurisdiction to enforce a hearing 
officer’s order or whether exhaustion is appropriate.295 To be clear, 
neither of these modifications presumes that a parent will have a 
meritorious injunction claim, but only that his or her claim should 
not be predestined to fail. A uniform federal change that explicitly 
provides clear guidance for this narrow circumstance gives more 
certainty and protection to families seeking to ensure that a district 
complies with their students’ IDEA protections during a school 
closing. To further buttress the appeal of making this change, it is 
important to briefly address the arguments against this proposal.
2. Three Critiques Addressed
The first critique of the proposal relates to its practical and 
potentially harmful effect on a district. Under these proposed 
modifications, a single student has the ability to bring a civil action 
for an alleged IDEA violation that may result in stopping an entire 
school from closing. This consequence may cost a district a 
substantial amount of money due to continuing building operations 
and maintenance,296 continuing transport of a shifting student 
294. CPS, for example, initially announced in March 2013 that it would 
close fifty-four schools by August 2013. See James B. Kelleher & Mary 
Wisniewski, Chicago Announces Mass Closing of Elementary Schools, REUTERS
(Mar. 21, 2013, 8:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/us-usa-
education-chicago-idUSBRE92K1CI20130322.
295. See Rita S. ex rel. Christopher S. v. Stanislaus Cnty. Office of Educ., 
384 F.3d 1205, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004) (Clifton, J., dissenting) (noting that litigation 
concerning the alleged IDEA violation and its exhaustion requirement lasted for 
more than four years).
296. See CHI. PUB. SCHS., DRAFT EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES MASTER PLAN 9
(2013), available at http://cps.edu/About_CPS/Policies_and_guidelines/Documents/
CPSDraftEducationalFacilitiesMasterPlan.pdf (stating that “[t]he average age of 
[Chicago Public School] buildings is 75 years old (i.e. built in 1938)” and that 
“[k]eeping up with the basic repair and maintenance of the current facilities footprint 
has been estimated at $350 [m]illion per year”).
1202 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1161
population,297 and providing redundant educational programming and 
the cost of litigation.298 The cost savings for CPS’s proposed school 
closings, for example, equated to $43 million annually,299 though this 
number would not be representative of a single school closing or a 
small- to medium-sized district.300 No matter the district’s size, 
requiring a school to remain open will harm the district financially 
and administratively.301
There is no doubting the serious burdens that may result from 
the issuance of an injunction, but such factors are taken into 
consideration by the court when making its ruling.302 To grant a 
preliminary injunction, the court must consider two factors aimed 
toward weighing these potential consequences: (1) whether the 
alleged harm to the movant without the injunction outweighs the 
potential harm that the preliminary injunction will inflict on the non-
movant; and (2) whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction 
will disserve the public interest.303 It is true that a single student 
could temporarily halt a school closing; yet, this would only be done 
if the court first determines that the IDEA violation is so pervasive or 
severe that the financial and administrative harms should be 
temporarily subjugated.304 This safeguard is already in place to 
297. See id. (“One challenge [that the Chicago Public Schools] face in 
attempting to fund improvements to bring our facilities up to the level we all wish 
for our students is a shift in the city’s population. . . . This creates resource 
challenges for these schools and for our system as a whole.”).
298. See id. at 37 (“Given limited financial resources, [Chicago Public 
Schools] cannot provide new programs in every school impacted by a closure.”).
299. See id. at 36 (noting that the school closings and other cost-saving 
measures would result in an “operating cost savings of $43 million annually”).
300. See id. at 8 (“Chicago Public Schools ranks as the third largest school 
district in the nation with 403,461 students and 681 schools operating in 743 
buildings. The District is made up of 515 Elementary Schools, 13 Middle Schools, 
and 153 High Schools.”).
301. The main driving force behind school closings is typically financial 
strains. See supra Section I.A.
302. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
304. See Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-24, 2013 WL 4401439, at 
*28-29 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013) (“In the balancing phase, Plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that the harm they will suffer without an injunction outweighs any harm 
that may be suffered by Defendants or third-parties (the ‘public interest’) if the 
injunction is granted. The [c]ourt employs a sliding scale approach: ‘[t]he more 
likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his 
favor, the less likely he is to win, the more need it weigh in his favor.’ Here, because 
Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits based on the evidence they have 
presented at this stage in the two cases, they must demonstrate great harm in the 
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ensure that only the most extreme cases result in an injunction.305 Not 
permitting a single student to bring an action to require IDEA 
compliance undermines the importance of the IDEA and presupposes 
that financial concerns will always trump the educational rights of 
students with disabilities.
A second criticism of creating this exception to mandatory 
administrative exhaustion is the frequently proffered slippery-slope 
argument.306 Enumerating an additional exception to mandatory 
IDEA exhaustion will lead courts to open the floodgates to finding 
further exceptions, leaving the process ultimately without the 
practical force intended. This type of slippery-slope argument is 
frequently made as a reason to resist extending a legal principle.307
Yet, its underlying logic is not applicable to making this narrowly 
created change to the IDEA.308 Providing courts with jurisdiction to 
hear a dispute related to the administrative hearing from either party, 
rather than just the party aggrieved, is simply unsusceptible to further 
extension. Moreover, the proposed change to the administrative-
exhaustion requirement only applies in the specific circumstance of a 
claim seeking a preliminary injunction due to an alleged IDEA 
violation to temporarily prevent a school closing. This exception is 
absence of an injunction. But Plaintiffs have not provided the [c]ourt with 
persuasive evidence that the harm they will suffer without an injunction is greater 
than the harm others will suffer, including other students, if an injunction was 
granted. . . . Weighing the two sides, the [c]ourt finds that the harm to Defendants 
and third-parties, including other students, if the preliminary injunctions were 
granted, outweighs the harm, if any, that the individual Plaintiffs would experience 
in the absence of a preliminary injunction, particularly in light of the low likelihood 
that Plaintiffs would be successful on the merits of their claims based upon the 
current record.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, 
Inc. v. Girl Scouts of U.S., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086 (7th Cir. 2008))).
305. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
306. A slippery-slope argument “is the claim that we ought not make a sound 
decision today, for fear of having to draw a sound distinction tomorrow.” Eugene 
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1029-30
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. See, e.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 
521 (2012) (“The slippery slope argument, we note, is hardly novel or 
unique . . . .”); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 194 
n.16 (1999) (“‘Judges and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies; they are 
not supposed to ski it to the bottom.’” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 169 (1990))).
308. See generally Volokh, supra note 306, at 1029 (noting that legal 
“thinkers such as Lincoln, Holmes, and Frankfurter have recognized [that] slippery 
slope objections can’t always be dispositive” because a legal change is “often a risk 
that we need to take”).
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exceedingly narrowed to a unique circumstance, resulting in its 
underlying justifications being not easily transferable to diverging 
situations.
A third critique of the proposed two-part solution is that 
making both changes simply goes too far. Solely giving courts the 
power to enforce an administrative hearing officer’s order is 
arguably sufficient to ensure IDEA compliance—alleviating the need
to also modify the administrative-exhaustion requirement. The 
established administrative remedy process provides the opportunity 
for the hearing officer to efficiently remedy the dispute.309 Further, if 
the district fails to adhere to an order, then a parent can compel 
compliance by directly seeking court enforcement. This solution 
permits the use of the more streamlined administrative process while 
also providing the direct backing of the court. Consequently, there is 
no need to also grant an automatic waiver of the IDEA 
administrative-exhaustion process.
While providing this enforcement power would address the 
“party aggrieved” jurisdictional-giving language,310 this step alone 
falls short of fully resolving the problem. There is generally an 
extremely limited time between when a district announces a school 
closing and when the school physically closes.311 This narrow time 
frame does not provide parents with sufficient time to first engage in 
the administrative-exhaustion process and then, once it becomes 
apparent that the district is not fully complying, seek court 
enforcement.312 The alleged IDEA harm can continue unchecked 
without the ability to seek a preliminary injunction.313 A preliminary 
injunction first determines whether the alleged harm is so severe and 
likely to be meritorious that the closing procedures should be 
309. See Clark, supra note 21, at 4 (“If successful, administrative review 
helps to avoid unnecessary judicial intervention by giving school officials the first 
opportunity to correct any procedural or substantive errors in its proposal to the 
parent . . . .”); see also Neil F. ex rel. Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989, 992 
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the administrative hearing process should be given the 
“first crack” to resolve the dispute).
310. See supra Section III.B.
311. See, e.g., Kelleher & Wisniewski, supra note 294 (noting that CPS 
initially announced in March 2013 that it would close fifty-four schools by August 
2013); supra text accompanying note 236; Swan v. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 13 C 3623-
24, 2013 WL 4401439, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2013).
312. This process can be even more elongated in states that chose the two-
tiered administrative review system. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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temporarily halted to address the IDEA violation.314 Without a 
parent’s ability to initially seek this preliminary court review in 
extreme cases, the time will have likely passed after exhausting the 
administrative remedies for a preliminary injunction review to be 
worthwhile; once the school has closed and the students and 
programs have been reassigned, they cannot easily be reversed.315
Parents must have timely access to this essential form of relief before 
seeking a preliminary injunction becomes simply impracticable.316
CONCLUSION
Just as there is no time to waste for parents attempting to halt 
an imminent school closing because of an IDEA violation,317 there is 
similarly no time to spare to make these needed changes to the 
IDEA. With the rising prevalence of school closings across the 
United States,318 there is an increasing threat that students with 
disabilities will be denied the protections and services provided to 
them under the IDEA.319 Parents seeking to ensure IDEA compliance 
currently cannot timely seek a preliminary injunction to delay a 
school closing320 or get a court to force a district to fulfill a hearing 
officer’s order.321 The existing IDEA relies on a dangerous 
assumption that a hearing officer has the power to issue an adequate 
remedy and that such an order will be enforced in a timely manner.322
Much can be gleaned from collectively considering the aspects 
used by courts to apply or not apply mandatory IDEA administrative 
exhaustion.323 Requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is not 
314. See Crue v. Aiken, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083 (C.D. Ill. 2001).
315. See Barron ex rel. D.B. v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 655 F.3d 787, 793 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“[A]s a practical matter, it may be more than improbable that a hearing 
officer could ultimately enforce an order to the [district] to reverse its policy of 
cutting programs at the school’s physical location and out-sourcing services to home 
school districts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
316. See id. (stating that once a school program is eliminated, the 
administrative officer is unlikely to have the ability to reverse the district’s action 
despite an IDEA violation).
317. See generally Kelleher & Wisniewski, supra note 294 (noting that CPS 
initially announced in March 2013 that it would close fifty-four schools by August 
2013).
318. See supra Section I.A.
319. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Section II.C.
321. See supra Section III.B.
322. See supra Sections III.A-B.
323. See supra Sections II.C-D.
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appropriate when this collective view is applied to instances of 
seeking a preliminary injunction to temporarily halt an imminent 
school closing due to an alleged IDEA violation.324 The case may be 
that no claim will ever be strong enough to obtain a preliminary 
injunction in this context, but courts are artificially making this 
presupposition a reality.325 Congress is expected to reauthorize the 
IDEA,326 which presents an ideal opportunity for it to remedy the 
current administrative-exhaustion barrier by making two changes: (1) 
provide courts with the jurisdiction to hear disputes from either party 
stemming from an IDEA administrative hearing; and (2) waive 
mandatory administrative exhaustion for civil cases seeking a
preliminary injunction to temporarily prevent an imminent school 
closing due to a related IDEA violation.327 These two changes will 
help ensure that future actions for a preliminary injunction are not 
summarily dismissed for want of administrative exhaustion, but, 
rather, are adjudicated on the underlying merits of the claim.328 The 
time is now to take these steps to ensure that every student covered 
by the IDEA gets the required protection if—and, for many students 
in the United States, when—their school is slated to close.
324. See supra Sections III.A-D.
325. See supra Section II.D.
326. See generally Alyson Klein, Education Laws Overdue for Renewal 
Languish in Congress, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/
articles/2014/01/15/17congress_ep.h33.html.
327. See supra Subsection III.E.1.
328. See supra Subsection III.E.1.
